Recent events have fueled the discussion of the susceptibility of government policies to lobbying by foreigners. In this paper, we consider the role of foreign lobbying in determining trade and environmental regulations. In particular, we develop a differential game to examine the effects of foreign lobbying on the solutions for transboundary pollution stock control involving two trading countries linked by trade flows. Our analysis suggests that the success of trade policy as an instrument for enforcing cooperation and internalizing externalities depends critically on the degree of governments' corruptibility and susceptibility to international political influence. The model explores optimal pollution regulation strategies, the evolution and equilibrium level of pollution stock, and welfare implications under two different scenarios: in the presence and in the absence of foreign lobbying. Comparison of the outcomes of these scenarios shows that foreign lobbying may lead to a less stringent regulation of the transboundary pollution externality and to degradation of environmental quality.
Introduction
Recent events have brought to public attention the significant extent of foreign lobbies' involvement in domestic economic and environmental policymaking.
1 Being a key player in the world markets, the United States economy, in particular, has become a focus of lobbying by foreign governments and private organizations, trying to achieve more favorable business conditions (Jobst 2002; Kee, Olarreaga, and Silva 2007) .
International trade is by far the most common issue targeted by foreign lobbies, yet increasingly foreign lobbying is targeting domestic environmental policies and regulations.
2 Such lobbying influence may be particularly effective in situations where two countries are bilateral trading partners and also share a transboundary pollution problem. Because there is no international political authority to enforce international cooperation, unilateral trade policies are seen as one of the few instruments available for one partner to encourage the other to cooperate in abating pollution (Cabo, Escudero, and Martin-Herran, 2001 ). However, since trade and environmental policies affect income distribution within and between the countries, they may create incentives for both domestic and foreign special interest groups to influence domestic policy decisions. A few recent studies have considered how the presence of domestic environmental lobbies may affect the determination of trade and environmental regulations when trading countries are also linked by transboundary pollution spillover (e.g., Conconi, 2003; Limao, 2005) . However, to our knowledge, no comparable study has been made of the importance of foreign lobbying in determining environmental and trade policy outcomes.
The purpose of the following paper is to address this gap in the economics literature.
By examining how the presence of foreign lobbying may affect the role of trade policies in bringing about the degree of cooperation needed to deal with transboundary pollution problems, our paper bridges two distinct literatures on the political economy of trade problems. Most of the analytical contributions in this area build on the common agency model of Grossman and Helpman (1994) where policy is determined by interactions between the policymaker and organized lobby groups offering the government political contributions contingent on policy decisions made (Schulze and Ursprung 2001) . Although the focus of Grossman and Helpman model is on trade policy and no environmental externalities are considered, a number of extensions do consider such externalities (e.g. Barbier, Damania, and Leonard, 2005; Damania and Fredriksson, 2003; Damania and List, 2000; Lopez and Mitra 2000) . A second, distinct set of studies extend the Grossman-Helpman model to consider the competing influence of domestic and foreign lobbies in the political process of trade policy formation (e.g. Gavande,
Krishna and Robbins 2006), which is supported by empirical evidence on the role of foreign lobbies in influencing U.S. trade policies such as export growth promotion and tariff preferences (Jobst 2002; Kee, Olarreaga, and Silva 2007) . To our knowledge, there exist no studies of the economic effects of foreign lobbying on both trade and environmental policies, in which the countries are linked by trade flows and transboundary stock pollution.
Transboundary stock pollution problems are particularly difficult to regulate
internationally, yet are becoming a growing global environmental problem (UNEP 2002; OECD 2007) . Examples of such transboundary stock externalities include water pollutants (such as heavy metals or agricultural runoff) that cross national boundaries and accumulate in the regions located downstream, or emissions of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides (acid rain) that may accumulate across the border as a result of the prevailing direction of winds. This paper develops a dynamic model to investigate the role that foreign lobbying may play in the "second-best" solution for control of such transboundary pollution problems involving two trading nations.
3
Our model also addresses another shortcoming in the trade and environment literature. Existing studies analyze the effects of lobbying activity in a static framework, which does not account for the fact that the lobbying influence over any kind of political decision often has to be built and maintained over time. At the same time, effective 3 It has been argued that trade policy may serve a "second-best" instrument to limit transnational pollution in a somewhat similar role as a Pigouvian tax performs within a single political jurisdiction (Baumol and Oates, 1988; Markusen, 1975a and 1975b) . A similar "second-best" approach is the use trade measures to modify the behavior of trading partners, i.e. the threat of trade sanctions may be used to encourage international cooperation on reducing environmental pollution (Nordstrom and Vaughan, 1999 While the rules of WTO generally do not allow its members to increase import tariffs, the GATT Article XX (paragraphs b and g) gives WTO members limited freedom to use trade measures that would otherwise be inconsistent with GATT obligations to protect human, animal or plant life or health, or to conserve exhaustible natural resources. In cases of transboundary air and water pollution it is conceivable that trade instruments might be used to induce the government with jurisdiction over polluter to address the externality (UNEP, 2005 , Condon, 2004 .
Field Code Changed
Field Code Changed offer the Upstream government an alternative to implementing environmental policy and monitoring its execution and help prevent the Downstream policymaker from imposing a higher tariff.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a dynamic model of transboundary stock pollutant control. Section 3 presents the differential game of pollution control undertaken in the presence of foreign lobbying. Section 4 examines a linear-quadratic specification of the game and analyses evolution and stability properties of the Markov perfect equilibrium. Section 5 offers concluding remarks.
A Model of Transboundary Pollution Control
As a reference scenario, we look at the outcomes of trade policy being used to 
where k represents the rate of pollution decay. Although pollution is generated by 
5 Previous studies of the political-economic link between trade and environmental policies are predominantly static. However, in many important transboundary problems damages are caused by the stock rather than the flow of pollution. Thus following the recent environmental literature (e.g., Dockner and Long (1993) , Mason (1997) , List and Mason (2001) ), we approach the problem in a dynamic framework. 6 We assume that Downstream has market power to influence the terms of trade through its tariff. 7 From now on, unless otherwise stated, we will suppress the time argument t. 
where r is the positive discount rate that is assumed constant and identical for both countries. The current-value Hamiltonian for this optimization problem can be written as
where θ is the co-state variable representing the shadow price of pollution for the Downstream government and thus θ is presumably negative.
The necessary conditions for the maximum principle require that the optimal tariff sets the marginal welfare cost associated with the tariff equal to the marginal benefit represented by the shadow value of the marginal pollution reduction,
and that the shadow price of pollution evolves at the rate equal to the marginal damage from pollution less the opportunity cost of cutting down emissions by one unit,
It can be demonstrated that the solution to this optimization problem leads to a unique saddle point steady state characterized by the following conditions 8 : 8 The superscript e stands for the steady state equilibrium.
Equations (9)(9)- (11)(11) 
Transboundary Pollution Control in the Presence of Foreign Lobbying
We now turn to the scenario where the Upstream government tries to exert political pressure and to have an impact on the Downstream's policy in favor of lower tariffs. Imagine that the Upstream government can engage in foreign lobbying to affect the tariff decision by the Downstream government. To illustrate the potential influence of lobbying on the choice of the tariff rate, we assume that the Upstream government seeks to influence the Downstream government decision by investing in political capital.
Accumulated political capital is used by the Upstream government to lobby the authority in Downstream. To fix ideas, one can think of this stock of political capital as a fund of actual financial capital, which is used to make contributions to political parties, candidates or election campaigns. The accumulated influence over the legislative members in Downstream may be translated into majority of votes necessary to make a tariff policy decision. By investing in political capital the Upstream government is capable to influence the Downstream policymaker's decision in favor of a lower tariff, and thus in favor of increasing welfare of the Upstream country. The political capital, P, is assumed to evolve over time according to the following rule: After the Upstream country engages in lobbying for a less stringent tariff policy, it is no longer acting as a static player in the game. Since both countries are now making dynamic decisions that affect each player's payoffs, the appropriate model for our analysis is a differential game. We assume that both governments use Markov-perfect (feedback) strategies. These strategies are decision rules that dictate optimal actions of the respective players conditional on the current values of the pollution stock Z(t) and political capital stock P(t), which summarize the latest available information of the dynamic system. Thus Markov perfect strategies determine a subgame-perfect equilibrium: at every time t and for every possible value of Z(t) and P(t), the strategy defines an equilibrium set of decisions independent of previous actions.
Assuming that the Downstream government plays the Markov strategy , the Upstream government chooses the time path of investment by solving the following maximization problem:
We solve this problem using Pontryagin's maximum principle. The current-value
Hamiltonian is formulated as
where ξ Z represents the shadow price of pollution and ξ P represents the shadow price of political capital for the Upstream country. The maximum condition and the adjoint equations for the shadow prices of pollution and political capital, respectively, are
The partial derivatives and capture the reactions of the ; that is the large accumulated stock of political capital provides a motive for the Downstream decision-maker to reduce the tariff. The maximum condition (13)(13) implies that, at every instant, the Upstream government chooses the level of investment in political capital that equates the marginal cost of such investment and the shadow price of the political capital. Equation (14)(14) shows that the rate of change in the shadow price of pollution for the Upstream government is determined by the opportunity cost of reducing emissions by one unit, marginal reduction in Upstream's net surplus induced by that unit of emissions, and marginal contribution of that emission unit to the current value of the pollution stock. The evolution rule for the shadow price of political capital, (15)(15), implies that the shadow price of P(t) changes at the rate determined by the opportunity cost of holding on to a unit of political capital, marginal change in the current level of welfare in Upstream induced by that unit, marginal contribution of that unit to the current value of pollution stock. The (13) (13)- (15)(15) equation system illustrates that while the Upstream country is not being adversely affected by the stock of pollution, strategic considerations make the Upstream policymaker account for pollution accumulation in determining her strategy. Proof. See Appendix A.
Politics adds yet another layer to the Downstream policymaker's decision process:
the choice of the optimal tariff strategy is now influenced by lobbying efforts of the Upstream government and, in particular, by the level of political capital at every instant.
In spirit of Grossman and Helpman (1994) , we assume that the Downstream government's objective function in this case is represented by the discounted sum of citizens' welfare, Assuming that the Upstream authority plays the Markov-perfect strategy , the Downstream government chooses the time path of the tariff by solving the following maximization problem:
The current-value Hamiltonian for this problem can be written as: 
The partial induced by this tariff. Equation (17)(17) shows that the shadow price of pollution evolves at the rate determined not only by the opportunity cost of reducing emissions by one unit and the marginal damages caused by that unit, but also the marginal contribution of that emission unit to the enhancement of political capital value. Equation (18)(18) tells us that the rate of change of the shadow price of political capital for the Downstream government is given by the opportunity cost of holding on to a unit of political capital, marginal benefits received by the Downstream government from that unit, and the marginal contribution of that unit to the political capital value.
translates into the influence of the Upstream country's government over the Downstream authority's decisions. Now, as the Downstream policymaker derives additional utility from political contributions, she realizes the shadow price of the political capital stock, representing the marginal utility she would give up if one less unit of political capital was available. This information is being used by the Downstream authority in formulating the Markov perfect strategy: equation (17)(17) () (,) ()
(,) 
10 The superscript MP stands for the Markov perfect equilibrium. 
Evolution and Stability Properties of the Markov Perfect Equilibrium in a Linear-Quadratic Example
We finally discuss the evolution of pollution and political capital stocks and stability properties of the steady state equilibrium generated in the foreign lobbying game. In order to do so, we need to obtain the equilibrium strategies of both players. In general, finding the Markov perfect equilibrium is arduous or even impossible, since it requires solving two simultaneous partial differential equations. Nevertheless, this difficulty can be resolved when a linear-quadratic specification is considered, which allows Markov perfect strategies to be linear in both state variables. To characterize Markov perfect strategies for our model we impose some additional assumptions on the functional forms. We consider a model that is based on the linear demand and supply curves, linear marginal cost functions and fixed output-emissions proportions. This gives rise to the following linear-quadratic payoff functions: 
where is the level of emissions generated by the equilibrium level of output produced before the tariff imposition and is the marginal reduction in emissions caused by the tariff. The stock of pollution generates damages according to the strictly convex quadratic function:
where 0 s > is the rate of increase of the marginal pollution damages. The political investment cost, ) I ( ϕ , is described by the following quadratic function:
Finally, utility that the Downstream government derives from foreign lobby contributions is assumed to be quadratic as well:
where f is a positive parameter and it contain the information about the weight given to lobby contributions in the Downstream authority's objective function. Higher values of f indicate that Downstream authority is more willing to set tariff policy that diverge from the optimal tariff strategy in return for lobby contributions.
With these assumptions our differential game becomes linear-quadratic. Both governments maximize their net benefits subject to the evolution rules for the pollution stock and political capital stock: 
where i α and i γ , i=1,2,3, are positive parameters. We restrict our consideration to interior solutions and assume that Markov-perfect strategies (28)(28) and (29)(29) satisfy conditions of Propositions 1 and 2, meaning that both the tariff and investment are increasing in the pollution stock and decreasing in political capital.
Upon substitution of the equilibrium strategies (28)(28) and (29)(29) into state equations, we can rewrite evolution equations for both pollution and political capital as follows:
To obtain the steady state values for pollution and political capital, we set equations (30)(30) and (31)(31) equal to zero. The solution to this system yields a steady state pollution stock given by
and a steady state political capital stock given by
Steady state tariff and investment levels can be obtained by substituting (32)(32) and (33)(33) into the equilibrium strategies (28)(28) and (29)(29).
Since the optimal strategies (28) (28) and (29)(29) are linear in Z and P, we only need to examine stability properties of the solution to the system (30)(30) and (31)(31), which already contains the information about the optimal tariff and investment paths. of either stock is fairly close to the long-run equilibrium, then the stock will experience an initial increase followed by a monotonic descent to the steady state.
Using our results, the optimal solution paths for the stock of pollution and political capital are depicted graphically in Figure 1 . In general, our model would require construction of a four-variable phase diagram to illustrate the convergence of the system to the Markov perfect equilibrium. But in light of the linear-quadratic example considered, this difficulty may be resolved. In view of the fact that both the optimal tariff and investment paths are linearly dependent on Z  and P  , we are able to reduce the representation of our four-dimensional equilibrium to a two-dimensional phase diagram, shown in Figure 1 . Figure 1 displays a unique and stable equilibrium, and the directions of phase trajectories suggest that the time paths of political capital and pollution stocks are determined by their initial levels. If both the initial levels of stocks are sufficiently far away from the long run equilibrium, the streamlines never venture beyond a single phase space region, and both the stocks monotonically ascend to the steady state (or descend, in the case of high initial levels of Z and P). By contrast, if the initial value of either stock is sufficiently close to the respective steady state level, the streamlines will cross over from one phase space region onto another, showing that the direction of movement of this stock will change along its evolution path.
Concluding Remarks
Transboundary pollution problems such as acid rain or water pollution pose a special challenge to the regulators. When several countries are affected by the externality, there often exists no international political authority to enforce cooperation. Collective action solution is particularly difficult to obtain when damages are unidirectional and countries have asymmetric incentives. In this context, it has been argued that trade policy can be used as a tool for creating or increasing the incentives to internalize cross-border externalities. While the discussion of the effectiveness of trade sanctions in tackling transboundary externalities continues, most authors agree that trade measures can at least be a useful mechanism for attempting to modify the behavior of foreign governments, discourage free-riding and enforce international cooperation. In the context of our model, this would imply that although the Upstream country does not suffer from (or does not care about) pollution, it may be induced to enforce environmental regulations and engage The analysis above suggests that the success of trade policy as an instrument for enforcing cooperation and internalizing externalities depends critically on the degree of governments' corruptibility and susceptibility to international political influence. In our model, tariffs based on the current pollution stock are used as a "stick" to induce the Upstream country to internalize the externality. Our findings indicate that if the Downstream's policymaker is corruptible, such policy will also create incentives for foreign lobbying, which may offer the Upstream government an alternative tool to environmental regulation and abatement useful in achieving her goal of a lower tariff her country is facing. In making the decision of which approach to use in order to obtain the benefit of reduction in tariffs, the Upstream authority compares the cost of abatement to the cost of lobbying activities. As noted in Kee, Olarreaga, and Silva (2004) , foreign lobbying is a high return activity, while imposing and monitoring environmental regulations is likely to be associated with significant costs that the Upstream country would have to bear. A high degree of corruptibility of the Downstream authority may significantly reduce the possibility of trade sanctions threat being able to encourage international cooperation in the externality regulation. Therefore, an important implication of our analysis is that governments' corruptibility and vulnerability to international political pressure needs to be taken into account in the discussion of the role for trade policy in stimulating cooperation between the countries regarding transboundary pollution problems. It follows from equations (14)(14) and (15) 
In (B1), the expression in brackets is the second order condition for the Downstream country's maximization problem, and therefore is negative. Since , the whole expression (B1) is positive; thus is an increasing function of .
Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 2
Assume the opposite and let the steady state tariff chosen by the Downstream government be higher in the presence of foreign lobbying:
Since emissions are decreasing with tariff, we can write that
It is then clear from equations (10)(10) and (21)(21) 
Combining inequalities (C2)-(C3) with equation (20)(20), we can infer that
In light of Lemma, it then follows from equations (7)(7) and (16) Using the initial conditions 
that is if both the initial levels of Z and P are sufficiently below their equilibrium levels.
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